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Sponsored by the Center for Science and Technology Development of the Ministry of Education
Supervised by Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China
The quantum-key-distribution (QKD)-based quantum private query (QPQ) has become a research hotspot in recent years. Although such QPQ protocols are practical, joint-measurement (JM) attack is a noteworthy threat to the security of the database. Specifically, a malicious user can illegally obtain entries more than the average number of honest users from the database. Taking Jakobi et al.\'s protocol as an example, a malicious user can obtain up to 500 bits from a database of 10000 bits in one query instead of the expected 2.44 bits. In order to prevent JM attacks, Yang et al. proposed a novel classical post-processing against the JM attack. But after analysis, we found that there are security flaws in these protocols. It is impossible to achieve joint measurement resistance in the quantum private query agreement between the two parties only through a simple classical post-processing process.