Pricing Decision of One Leader and Multi-follower Ecological Industry  Chain under Incomplete Information

YU Haijie; SU Sheng

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Pricing Decision of One Leader and Multi-follower Ecological Industry Chain under Incomplete Information

YU Haijie 1 *,SU Sheng 2

1.School of Management and Economics ,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,

2. School of Computer Science and Engineering ,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China

*Correspondence author

#Submitted by

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Funding: Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education（No.20090185120002）

Opened online:26 August 2010

Accepted by: none

Citation: YU Haijie,SU Sheng.Pricing Decision of One Leader and Multi-follower Ecological Industry Chain under Incomplete Information[OL]. [26 August 2010] http://en.paper.edu.cn/en_releasepaper/content/4382517

Pricing decisions on products and byproducts are crucial to cooperation between different parts of the ecological industry chain. However, it is neglected by the current studies on ecological industry chain. The pricing decision models for the ecological industry chain with one leader and multiple followers were studied in this paper. We defined the static Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the pricing decision problem under incomplete information. The problem is divided into multiple sub-problems with complete information of which Nash equilibrium solution is a part of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the whole pricing decision problem with incomplete information. Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the decision problem with the dominance of manufacturer is obtained by the combination of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the transferred dynamic game sub-problems with complete information. Genetic algorithm was developed to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions of these sub-problems. Computational instances were given to verify the proposed models and methods.

Keywords:Pricing Decision; Ecological Industry Chain; Game Theory; Incomplete Information; One Leader and Multi-follower

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